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Hartle and Srednicki have argued that there is no observational evidence favoring our typicality.
Here it is shown that such evidence does arise from including the normalization principle requirement
that the sum of the likelihoods for all possible observations is normalized to unity in each theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
As Hartle and Srednicki [1] correctly note, “An increas-
ingly common kind of reasoning in fundamental cosmol-
ogy starts from an assumption that some property of hu-
man observers is typical in some class C of objects in the
universe,” for example in [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]
which they cite later. They go on to claim [1] that “it
is perfectly possible (and not necessarily unlikely) for us
to live in a universe in which we are not typical.” While
I agree that it is perfectly possible, in this paper I shall
argue that it would be unlikely when one properly nor-
malizes the likelihoods.
That is, I shall argue that within each possible theory
of the universe, the likelihood would be small that we
are atypical, though one could assign a sufficiently high
prior probability to a theory in which we are atypical to
overcome this small likelihood. That is, the theory might
have such high a priori probability that after a Bayesian
analysis it could have the highest a posteriori probability
even though it makes us atypical and unlikely. However,
purely from the likelihoods, properly normalized, typi-
cality is favored, contrary to what Hartle and Srednicki
conclude when they do not require that the sum of the
likelihoods for all possible observations sum to unity.
A key issue to be discussed below is how likelihoods are
to be defined by a theory, which seems to lie at the heart
of Hartle and Srednicki’s disagreement with calculations
favoring typicality. Another key issue is the gap between
the first sentence of their conclusion (v), “We have data
that we exist in the universe, but we have no evidence
that we have been selected by some random process,”
with which I agree, and the second sentence of that con-
clusion, “We should not calculate as though we were,”
with which I disagree.
Before getting into these points of disagreement, it may
be helpful to list points of agreement.
I do agree with Hartle and Srednicki’s conclusion (i),
“A theory is not incorrect merely because it predicts that
we are atypical.” Low typicality merely implies low like-
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lihood, but one must also consider the prior probability
assigned to the theory.
I also agree with conclusion (iii), “No part of our data
should be neglected in the process of discriminating be-
tween competing theories unless it can be demonstrated
that the relevant probabilities are insensitive to it.”
Strictly speaking, I also agree with conclusion (vi),
whose first sentence is, “In a fundamental theory of quan-
tum cosmology, there is no need for any assumption of
typicality to predict what we might see.” I would say
that all we need to do is consider theories that predict
correctly normalized likelihoods for all possible observa-
tions, and then the typicality will be automatically re-
flected in these likelihoods.
I furthermore strongly agree with Hartle and Srednicki
in using Bayesian probability theory [13, 14, 15], with its
prior probability P (Ti) for each theory Ti, its likelihoods
P (Dj |Ti) or conditional probabilities for each possible
data set Dj given the theory Ti, and its posterior prob-
abilities P (Ti|Dj) or reverse conditional probabilities for
the theories Ti given the particular data setDj that is ob-
tained. These posterior probabilities are given in terms
of the prior probabilities and the likelihoods by Bayes’
theorem,
P (Ti|Dj) = P (Dj |Ti)P (Ti)∑
i P (Dj|Ti)P (Ti)
. (1.1)
In particular, I concur with Hartle and Srednicki that
Bayesian analysis provides a framework for distinguishing
“facts, logical deduction, and prejudices.” As they nicely
express it, “Data are the domain of facts, likelihoods are
the domain of logical deduction, and the priors are the
domain of theoretical prejudice.”
In this Bayesian approach, my key difference from Har-
tle and Srednicki is that I propose that one follow the
normalization principle: One should only consider theo-
ries that each give likelihoods summing to unity for all
possible data sets,
∑
j
P (Dj |Ti) = 1. (1.2)
I shall take an atypical observation to be an observed
data set that has an anomalously low likelihood, so that
atypical observations are unlikely, giving small weights in
2Bayes’ theorem. (I think of observations as being more
fundamental than observers and hence shall focus on typ-
ical or atypical observations rather than on typical or
atypical observers, but one could define an atypical ob-
server as one who makes atypical observations.)
Here I am not using the technical definition of typi-
cality I have proposed in [16, 17, 18], which after email
discussions with Srednicki [19] I realize has some prob-
lems that I shall discuss elsewhere [20], but the looser
idea that atypical observations are those that would be
unlikely to be chosen in a random selection from all ob-
servations predicted by the theory. Although a precise
definition is not needed here, it might help to have the
following definition in mind as an example:
Consider all the observed data sets Dj predicted by
some theory Ti, and rank them in decreasing order of
their normalized likelihoods P (Dj|Ti). Define the median
observationDm as the one with the smallest value ofm in
this ordered sequence such that
∑
j≤m P (Dj |Ti) > 1/2.
Then one might define the typicality of any observed data
set Dj in this theory as being tj = P (Dj |Ti)/P (Dm|Ti).
For j ≤ m, the typicality is large, tj ≥ 1, so that at
least half of the likelihood occurs for observed data sets
with high typicality. Atypical observations would corre-
spond to low typicality, tj ≪ 1, and would occur only for
j > m and a small fraction of the total amount of likeli-
hood. That is, it is unlikely that an observation would be
atypical if it were selected randomly with a probability
given by its normalized likelihood.
II. DATA
There are different ideas for what should constitute a
data set Dj to be used in a Bayesian probability analysis.
Since each theory Ti is supposed to assign a likelihood
P (Dj |Ti) to each data set Dj, it should be the theory
that defines the possible data sets. Thus different ideas
of what the data sets are may be considered as differences
in the theories. However, to compare different theories by
a Bayesian analysis, they should all have data sets that
are members of some single encompassing set of data sets,
say S. Then for any theory whose data sets form only a
proper subset of S, one can simply say that that theory
predicts zero likelihood for all other data sets of S. In
this way we can say that each theory Ti assigns a unique
value to the likelihood P (Dj |Ti) for each data set Dj in
the full set S of such data sets.
Although my argument does not depend on which full
set of data sets S is chosen (so long as it is precisely de-
fined), let me give some possible choices. The one that
seems the most fundamental to me is the set, say S1, of all
possible conscious perceptions [16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24].
Roughly, each individual conscious perception is all that
a conscious observer is aware of at once, what Bostrom
[25] calls an observer-moment. If this conscious percep-
tion is regarded as a data set, the data would be the
content of that awareness. In this S1, each different pos-
sible conscious perception would be a member, and any
two perceptions with different contents would be different
data sets.
Hartle and Srednicki use an HSI, a human scientific
IGUS (information gathering and utilizing system), with
the data set including “every scrap of information that
the HSI possesses about the physical universe: every
record of every experiment, every astronomical observa-
tion of distant galaxies, every available description of ev-
ery leaf, etc., and necessarily every piece of information
about the HSI itself, its members, and its history.” Al-
though they consider only the data set D that our partic-
ular HSI has (and thereby avoid the issue of normalizing
the likelihoods over all possible data sets), one can cer-
tainly consider all such data sets, say forming the set S2.
Every such data set within S2 would differ if it had differ-
ent scraps of information or different information within
at least one of the scraps.
Another possible set, say S3, of data sets would be
the set of all complete physical descriptions of all planets
(including what is on them, of course). Each physical
different planet would give a different data set in this set
of data sets.
Yet another possible set of data sets, say S4, would be
the set of all complete descriptions of the causal past of
any event of spacetime (assuming for this that spacetime
has a definite causal structure, which is not likely to be
true in quantum gravity).
For any particular Bayesian analysis, one should have
a definite set S of well-defined possible alternative data
sets. There should be some parallelism between the data
sets within S, so it would not appear to be a good idea,
for example, to use an S that is the union of the set S1
of all possible conscious perceptions and the set S2 of all
possible HSI data sets, since each HSI data set may con-
tain one or more (usually many) conscious perceptions.
Because the set S of data sets must be well defined,
with distinct members (the data sets themselves), the
data sets within S must all be different and can be re-
garded as different alternatives, different possible obser-
vations. By assumption, an observation (whether a con-
scious perception, all the data of an HSI, or all the data
of a planet) is of a distinct data set Dj with S, and
therefore each theory Ti should assign a definite likeli-
hood P (Dj |Ti) for each data set Dj. Since the data sets
are alternatives of what might be observed, and since by
assumption some particular data set actually is observed,
for each theory Ti the sum of the likelihoods (the con-
ditional probabilities of the data sets, given the theory)
should sum to unity, the normalization condition (1.2).
III. LIKELIHOODS
Each normalized likelihood P (Dj|Ti) that I have dis-
cussed above may be regarded as the probability, condi-
tional upon the theory Ti, that an observation (randomly
chosen without restricting the data) gives the data set
3Dj . If one considers the observation to be made by an
observer (whether a single conscious being at one time, a
human scientific information gathering and utilizing sys-
tem, an entire planet, or an entire region of spacetime),
it is a ‘first-person’ observation, a distinct alternative to
any other first-person observation of a different data set.
Since as first-person observations, the different data sets
are mutually exclusive (the first-person at one time ob-
serves only one data set), their probabilities should add
up to one, the normalization principle expressed by Eq.
(1.2).
Hartle and Srednicki implicitly discard the first-person
nature of the observation. Instead of using the full first-
person knowledge, “We observe the data set D,” they
consider only the reduced third-person knowledge and
say, “All we know is that there exists at least one such
region containing our data.” Therefore, instead of cal-
culating the likelihood of our data D as the normalized
likelihood of this data set out of all other possible first-
person data sets, they effectively calculate the (different)
probability that this data set exists in at least one region.
That is, they consider not all possible data setsDj in S as
the alternatives, but simply the binary alternatives that
our particular data set D occurs somewhere and that D
does not occur somewhere [19].
These two procedures, theirs and mine, are equivalent
in usual laboratory experiments in which only one data
set actually occurs (in a single branch of the Everett
many-worlds wavefunction). Then if any data set Dj
occurs that is different from D, D does not also occur, so
the probability that D does not occur is the sum of the
probabilities for all Dj different from D. But in a large
enough universe, many different data sets can all actu-
ally occur. Then the probability that D does not occur
can be much smaller than the sum of the probabilities
for each of the other data sets to occur.
The third-person existence of two different data sets,
Dj andDk with j 6= k, is not mutually exclusive or incon-
sistent, but the first-person observation of two different
data sets is mutually exclusive. Therefore, the third-
person existence probabilities for the data sets can be
different from the first-person observational probabilities
for these same data sets.
Ordinary quantum theory with a complete orthogo-
nal set of projection operators, or the consistent histo-
ries approach with a decoherent set of class operators
[26, 27, 28, 29], is well-suited for calculating the third-
person existence probabilities. But if one wants the first-
person observational probabilities, one needs something
more.
For example, consider a toy model for S that consists of
only two possible data sets, D1 andD2. Suppose that the
quantum state is such that with unit probability, there
exists 1 region with an observer observing the data set
D1, and 999 regions that each have an observer observing
the data set D2. Ordinary quantum theory would give
the third-person existence probability of both D1 and D2
as unity. Since these two existence possibilities are not
mutually exclusive, their existence probabilities do not
add up to 1 but rather to 2. On the other hand, it would
be quite reasonable to assume that the first-person obser-
vational probabilities are the same for all 1 000 regions,
so that the normalized probability of D1 is 0.001 and of
D2 is 0.999. That is, there are 999 times as many re-
gions with D2 as there are with D1 (and we assume that
there is nothing else of importance, other than these dif-
ferent data sets, distinguishing the observers in the two
regions, so all of them can be considered to have equal
weight), so the probability of observing D2 is 999 times
the probability of observing D1.
If the data sets are conscious perceptions, then one
way of getting normalized probabilities for each of them
is by the framework of Sensible Quantum Mechanics
[16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23] or Mindless Sensationalism [24],
which in the discrete normalizable case assigns a proba-
bility to each conscious perception that is the expectation
value of a corresponding positive ‘awareness operator.’
There is no requirement that these positive operators be
orthogonal to each other or even be proportional to pro-
jection operators (though they might be approximately
proportional to the integral over all of spacetime of pro-
jection operators in local regions). In the example above,
assuming that the operator corresponding to D1 (for the
first region) and to D2 (for the remaining 999 regions)
receives the same contribution to the expectation value
from each region, then since there are 999 times as many
regions giving D2, the corresponding awareness opera-
tor would have 999 times the probability as that for D1,
leading to the same probabilities as in the previous para-
graph.
Hartle and Srednicki [1] object that calculations like
this one “make the selection fallacy that we are randomly
chosen from a class of objects by some physical process,
despite the absence of any evidence for such a process,”
further stating in a particular example, “In fact, there
has been no selection at all.” As mentioned in the Intro-
duction, I do agree with them that “We have data that
we exist in the universe, but we have no evidence that we
have been selected by some random process,” but I dis-
agree with their conclusion that “We should not calculate
as though we were.” If the universe does have many ob-
servers, there is indeed no physical selection within them
of which exist and which do not, since they all exist in
the third-person sense. However, to interpret one’s first-
person experience, it is perfectly legitimate to calculate
as if it were randomly selected from the set of all obser-
vations.
Bostrom has cogently argued in [25], p. 162, for the
Strong Self-Sampling Assumption (SSSA): “One should
reason as if one’s present observer-moment were a ran-
dom sample from the set of all observer-moments in its
reference class.” This is similar to how I might today
[11] state my Conditional Aesthemic Principle (CAP)
[16]: “Unless one has compelling contrary evidence, one
should reason as if one’s conscious perception were a ran-
dom sample from the set of all conscious perceptions.” I
4would argue [11] that the reference class of all observer-
moments (which I would call conscious perceptions, each
being all that one is consciously aware of at once) should
be the universal class of all observer-moments.
Comments analogous to that about the “selection fal-
lacy” may be made about the different branches of the
wavefunction in the many-worlds interpretation of quan-
tum theory, in which the wavefunction never collapses.
All of the branches with nonzero amplitude may be con-
sidered actually to occur, with no real physical selection
between them, but for an observer predicting what he
may observe in the future, it may be legitimate to make
what might be called the Copenhagen fallacy and calcu-
late as if there were probabilities for the various branches
of the wavefunction to be selected, say by a postulated
collapse of the wavefunction. Just as in this many-worlds
case where it may be legitimate to reason as if there are
probabilities for the selection of a particular branch of the
wavefunction (even if in fact there is no such selection),
so in the many-observations case it may be legitimate to
reason as if there are probabilities for the selection of a
particular observation.
Let me make the parallel between the Copenhagen fal-
lacy and the selection fallacy more explicit:
Collapse of the wavefunction is false (the “Copenhagen
fallacy”). But we can calculate likelihoods as if it hap-
pens and use them in a Bayesian analysis to get posterior
probabilities for theories.
Selection of observers is false (the “selection fallacy”).
But we can calculate likelihoods as if it happens and use
them in a Bayesian analysis to get posterior probabilities
for theories.
IV. CONSEQUENCES
When the full first-person information about an obser-
vation or observed data set is taken into account (“We
observe D”), and not just the third-person account (“D
exists”), then we can consider all the different data sets
to be mutually exclusive and hence have normalized like-
lihoods. It is then natural to have likelihoods that vary
monotonically with the typicality assigned to the obser-
vation, so that less typical observations have lower like-
lihood. More simply, atypical observations are unlikely.
The requirement that the likelihoods be normalized
means that it does matter what other observations are
possible in a theory, besides what we may actually ob-
serve. A theory that predicts a huge number of other pos-
sible observations of significant relative likelihood, say by
Boltzmann brains [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12], would tend to
give a lower likelihood for our observation than a theory
that does not. This contradicts the second sentence of
Hartle and Srednicki’s conclusion (ii): “What other ob-
servers might see, how many of them there are, and what
properties they do or do not share with us are irrelevant
for this process.”
Requiring the likelihoods of observations to be nor-
malized first-person probabilities, instead of the third-
person existence probabilities, also releases theories from
the enormous limitations of the second sentence of Har-
tle and Srednicki’s conclusion (iv): “Cosmological models
that predict that at least one instance of our data exists
(with probability one) somewhere in spacetime are indis-
tinguishable no matter how many other exact copies of
these data exist.” If one were forced to abide by that
limitation, then a huge variety of cosmological models
with a sufficiently large universe (spatially noncompact
cosmologies, and also spatially compact cosmologies with
enough inflation) would give nearly unit probability for
our data set and hence the same likelihoods. Thus ob-
servations would count for nothing in distinguishing be-
tween these theories, and much of cosmology would cease
to be an observational science.
Carter [30] has noted that the assumptions of Hartle
and Srednicki, considering only our data and not what
other observers might see, is an example of what, in com-
parison with the anthropic principle of assuming that we
are typical until it is shown otherwise [30], he has la-
beled [31] “the more sterile and restrictive autocentric
principle.” Since Hartle and Srednicki’s arguments im-
ply that one could not distinguish observationally any
cosmological theory that gives unit (or even any other
equal) likelihood to our observed data, it certainly seems
better to choose other principles that lead to varying like-
lihoods and hence the possibilities of testing cosmological
theories observationally.
If Hartle and Srednicki’s assumptions were adopted,
then theories with a sufficiently vast and varied multi-
verse to predict the existence of our data with near cer-
tainty would all have the same weight in a Bayesian anal-
ysis, greater than that of any theory that predicted the
existence of our data with significantly less than unit like-
lihood. This would seem to give an unfair advantage to
multiverse theories. It would also make them subject to
the criticism that they explain everything (since a huge
variety of data sets would then have nearly unit existence
likelihood) and thereby explain nothing. This seems far
too cheap a solution to the goal of science to explain our
observations.
A suitable multiverse theory might turn out to be the
best explanation of our observations, but it should have
to earn that status by its high prior probability (from
such considerations as being “simple, beautiful, precisely
formulable mathematically, economical in their assump-
tions, comprehensive, unifying, explanatory, accessible
to existing intuition, etc. etc.,” as Hartle and Srednicki
nicely put it) and by not too low a nontrivial value it
gives for the likelihood of our observed data set. Re-
placing the normalized first-person observational proba-
bilities with the third-person existence probabilities is a
cheat, like putting the theory on steroids.
In a Bayesian analysis to try to find a theory with the
maximum a posteriori probability, it seems unlikely that
one can avoid the tension between trying to make the
a priori probability high and trying to make the likeli-
5hood of our observations also high. For me, the simplest
theory, with the highest a priori probability, would be
the theory that nothing exists. However, the likelihood
of our observations would then be zero, so this theory
is ruled out observationally. (It would also run into the
problem of not obeying the normalization principle, since
it would give no nonzero observational likelihoods at all
to normalize.) The theory that everything existed would
seem to me to be the next simplest theory and hence have
the next highest a priori probability. If one then used
existence probabilities (conditional upon the theory) as
likelihoods, as Hartle and Srednicki seem to advocate,
then this simple theory would give unit likelihoods for
all possible observations and hence presumably the high-
est a posteriori probability.
Should we then quit physics and say that we have the
best possible theory of everything, namely the simple the-
ory that everything possible exists? I would say that this
is far too cheap an answer.
If instead we include the normalization principle as I
am advocating, then one would have to normalize the
likelihoods of all the observations. If, in the theory that
everything exists, one made the simple assignment that
all of the infinite number of possible observations have
equal likelihood, then their normalized value would be
zero, and the resulting a posteriori probability for this
theory would be zero, as indeed I would say it is. One
could of course try to go to an improved theory in which
although all possible observations exist, they have vary-
ing likelihoods that are normalized. Then we are back
to the problem of assigning nontrivial likelihoods, which
complicates the theory and reduces its a priori proba-
bility. Thus we have the challenge of finding the best
theory that neither is so complicated that it makes its
a priori probability too small, nor has the normalized
likelihoods spread so thinly that it makes the likelihood
of our observation too small (e.g., by making us highly
atypical).
One might try to go to the other extreme, maximizing
the typicality of our observed data set by formulating
the theory to predict that data set and only that data
set, thereby giving it unit likelihood. However, it would
be very surprising if any theory existed that predicted
our observations uniquely and was fairly simple. Since
such a theory is likely to be quite complicated, it would
naturally be assigned a low a priori probability. Most
scientists would presumably believe that even if one has
to reduce the likelihood and typicality of our observed
data from unity, one can gain far more in the a pri-
ori probability for a simpler theory. In other words, it
seems improbable that only our observed data exists or
has nonzero probability, and much more probable that
the correct theory predicts non-unit first-person observa-
tional probability for our data.
If we postulate that the first-person observational
probabilities that a theory predicts are not true probabil-
ities for an actual selection of our data from all possible
data sets, but rather measures for the actual existence of
the various data sets, then giving up on finding a simple
theory predicting unit likelihood for our data set is equiv-
alent to saying that other data sets actually do exist. In
this way we are led to a many-observations theory. The
many might be provided by a sufficiently large universe,
by the many-worlds of the Everett version of quantum
theory, and/or by a string landscape. It seems that the
trade-off between a priori probabilities and likelihoods
suggests that many different observed data sets exist, but
not all possible observed data sets exist equally (i.e., with
equal measures or equal likelihoods of being observed).
V. EXAMPLE
Let us take some set S of all possible data sets un-
der consideration and consider theories to explain one
of them. Suppose that the set of all possible data sets
is countable (though logically it need not be, if for ex-
ample they form a continuum). Imagine that there is a
procedure for ordering them by their complexity, so that
D1 represents the simplest possible data set, and so on.
Then Dj is the jth simplest data set. Let us assume that
our observed data set has j ≫ 1, so that what we observe
is by itself not extremely simple.
The theory, say T1, that gives the maximum likelihood
for this data set would be the one that predicts that
it alone occurs uniquely, so that it has unit likelihood,
P (Dj |T1) = 1. Assuming the background knowledge of
the S of all the possible data sets and their ordering by
complexity, theory T1 could be specified simply by giv-
ing the integer j. For most integers j of similar value,
this information would not be compressible, so one could
say that the number of bits of information in this single-
observation theory is roughly log2 j.
Next, consider an alternative multi-observation theory
in which the likelihoods for the various possible data sets
come from some specific normalized probability distri-
bution. For simplicity and concreteness, consider the-
ory TN which gives the geometric distribution with mean
N > 1, so P (Dj |TN) = (N − 1)j−1/N j. If we wanted to
choose N to maximize the likelihood P (Dj |T2), we would
need to choose N = j. However, this theory, Tj, would
have more information than T1 (with the extra amount,
above that specifying N = j, saying that Tj gives a ge-
ometric distribution). Hence this Tj theory would pre-
sumably be assigned a lower a priori probability than
T1. Furthermore, it would also give a lower likelihood,
P (Dj |Tj) = (j − 1)j−1/jj ≈ e−j/j ≪ 1 = P (Dj |T1),
where the approximation and strong inequality occurs
for j ≫ 1, as I am assuming. Therefore, Tj would give
a much lower a posteriori probability than T1, showing
that multi-observation theories need not be better than
single-observation theories.
On the other hand, TN can be chosen to be much
simpler than Tj (assuming the generic case in which j
is an incompressible large integer, with roughly log2 j
bits of incompressible information) by choosing N to
6be much simpler than j. However, to keep the likeli-
hood P (Dj |Tj) from becoming too much smaller than
the maximum value P (Dj |Tj) ≈ e−1/j for fixed j
and N allowed to vary, N should be chosen to be
roughly the same value as j, say within a factor of 2
of j. For example, if N ≈ j/2, then P (Dj |TN) ≈
(2/j)e−2 ≈ (2/e)P (Dj|Tj) ≈ 0.736P (Dj|Tj) ≈ 0.271/j,
whereas if N ≈ 2j, then P (Dj |TN) ≈ (0.5/j)e−0.5 ≈
(
√
e/2)P (Dj|Tj) ≈ 0.824P (Dj|Tj) ≈ 0.303/j. Thus for
N within a factor of 2 of j, we always get P (Dj |TN ) >
1/(4j).
Now we can simply choose N to be the nearest power
of 2 less than or equal to j, N = 2[log2 j], with the square
bracket denoting the integer part of the logarithm to base
2. Then in binary, N has a 1 followed by [log2 j] 0’s,
the same as j with all binary digits after the first trun-
cated to 0. Thus whereas specifying j requires all [log2 j]
binary digits after the leading 1 to be specified, with
[log2 j] bits of information, N just requires a specifica-
tion of how many 0’s it has after the leading 1, which
is just [log2 [log2 j]] bits of information. For very large
generic (incompressible) j, N thus has much less infor-
mation than that in j itself.
Therefore, if the gain in the a priori probability of TN
from its relative simplicity of N , over that of the more
complex T1, overcomes the decrease in the likelihood of
the observed data set Dj from unity for T1 to near 1/(4j)
for TN , then in Bayes’ theorem, Eq. (1.1), the a posteri-
ori probability P (TN |Dj) for the multi-observation the-
ory TN with N = 2
[log
2
j] will exceed P (T1|Dj) for the
single-observation theory T1. In particular, this would
be the case if the prior probabilities obey the inequality
P (TN ) > 4jP (T1).
Suppose that one re-orders the T1, TN , and other possi-
ble theories (assumed to be countable) into increasing or-
der of complexity and lets I be the integer that gives this
new order, from 1 for the simplest theory, on up through
successively larger integers for more complex theories.
Then T1 and TN for integers N > 1 will all have places
in this order, so that one will get the function I(i) where
i = 1 for T1 and i = N for TN . (Of course, the resulting
infinite countable set of values I(i) will not exhaust the
positive integers, since there will also be another count-
ably infinite set of other theories whose I’s will partially
intertwine the I(i)’s.) I will be roughly 2 to the power
of the number of bits needed to specify the theory, so
I(1) ∼ j and I(N) ∼ log2 j for N = 2[log2 j] and j ≫ 1.
Now let us suppose that we take the a priori proba-
bilities P (Ti) ≡ p(I) to be a monotonically decreasing
function of the order of complexity I, so that simpler
theories are assigned higher prior probabilities and more
complex theories are assigned lower prior probabilities. If
the prior probabilities as a function of I, p(I), fall off too
slowly with I, then one will get that the posterior proba-
bility of the single-observation theory T1 is greater than
that of the multi-observation theory TN for any N , such
as the simple choice N = 2[log2 j]. However, if p(I) falls
off sufficiently rapidly with I, then instead the simpler
multi-observation theory will be favored with the higher
a posteriori probability.
In the example above, it appears that it is sufficient
for p(I) to fall off at least as rapidly as I−s for any
s > 1, or even as I−1(ln I)−s for any s > 1. For ex-
ample, consider p(I) = (6/pi2)I−2, which would give
a normalized prior probability distribution for a count-
ably infinite set of theories ordered by complexity, with
I = 1 for the simplest, etc. This set of priors would then
give the ratio of the posterior probability of the multi-
observation theory TN to that of the single-observation
theory T1 as P (TN |Dj)/P (T1|Dj) ∼ j/(4 log2 j) ≫ 1.
Thus with this choice of priors, the greater simplicity of
the multi-observation theory over the single-observation
theory would more than compensate for the reduced like-
lihood it gives to the observed data set, so in the end the
multi-observation theory is favored.
Another simple set of prior probabilities that I have
advocated [16, 17, 18] is p(I) = 2−I . Since this very
strongly favors simpler theories (each of which is twice
as probable a priori as the next simplest), in the exam-
ple above it gives a much higher posterior probability
to the multi-observation theory: P (TN |Dj)/P (T1|Dj) ∼
2j/(4j2).
The situation is somewhat similar to theories of solip-
sism versus theories in which other people are real. Solip-
sism would give a higher likelihood for one’s observations,
but it is not nearly so simple as theories that other people
are real. Therefore, when one chooses prior probabilities
falling sufficiently rapidly with complexity (as humans
apparently do implicitly without even consciously think-
ing about it), in the end one favors theories in which
other people are real.
The example above shows that typicality itself, in the
form of increased likelihoods, often is not sufficient to
overcome the higher prior probabilities one might like to
assign to simpler theories that may predict larger num-
bers of possible observed data sets and correspondingly
lower likelihoods for each. However, this does not work if
the simpler theory predicts too large a range of observed
data sets and hence makes the normalized likelihood of
each one too small. In particular, theories that predict
that all possible observations, out of an infinite set, occur
with equal likelihood give zero likelihood for any partic-
ular data set and hence have zero posterior probabilities
(unless absolutely all of the prior probability is concen-
trated upon such theories).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have seen that when one imposes the normalization
principle and restricts to theories that each give likeli-
hoods summing to unity for all possible data sets, typi-
cality is automatically favored in the likelihoods. Since
this preference comes directly from the normalized like-
lihoods, it is not and need not be introduced “through
a suitable choice of priors” as Hartle and Srednicki [1]
7suggest. Instead, the prior probabilities for theories may
be chosen to “favor theories that are simple, beautiful,
precisely formulable mathematically, economical in their
assumptions, comprehensive, unifying, explanatory, ac-
cessible to existing intuition, etc. etc.,” as Hartle and
Srednicki propose.
The only sense in which I could be said to favor putting
typicality into the priors would be the interpretation that
imposing the normalization principle effectively assigns
zero prior probabilities to theories in which the likeli-
hoods of all possible observations do not sum to unity,
as I would indeed do if that interpretation were forced
upon me. But not imposing this requirement does not
seem to me to make sense (and also leads to many sterile
cosmological theories that cannot be tested against ob-
servations). It seems rather analogous to not imposing
the requirement of mathematical consistency. Therefore,
I would argue that the normalization principle is a funda-
mental principle of probability for multi-observation the-
ories that need not be listed among the optional proper-
ties Hartle and Srednicki have nicely enumerated for the
theoretical prejudice of choosing the priors.
Typicality by itself does not guarantee that the theory
with the highest posterior probability will make us typi-
cal. However, typicality is favored in the likelihoods. One
need not impose it separately, but in discussions in which
one does not explicitly invoke the full Bayesian frame-
work, assuming typicality may be a legitimate shortcut
for selecting between different theories for our observa-
tions. We are unlikely to be highly atypical.
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